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ABSTRACT 
In the early 1990s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) 
created their own military arms that later evolved into 
sophisticated paramilitary groups, now engaged in an all-
out war against the state and/or anyone who represents an 
obstacle for their criminal activities. Furthermore, they 
are not hesitating to use tactics of extreme violence as 
terrorism to psychologically impact their enemies and those 
civilians not supporting them. Historically, terrorism 
related to drugs is new in Mexico but not in Latin America. 
The illegal drug trade has funded terrorist groups in Peru 
and Colombia, empowered criminal organizations and caused 
them to challenge the state's authority. An objective 
comparison of these cases can teach important lessons and 
show new paths to follow in the solution of Mexico's costly 
conflict. This thesis will define: How, where and why are 
DTO's paramilitary groups opting for terrorism in Mexico. 
It will outline the proper mechanisms to counter that 
terrorism. There is a long way to go to win the war on 
drugs in Mexico, but in order to apply new long term, less 
direct, and more social-based strategies, it is urgent for 
the state to set the proper security conditions in the 
short term. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: TERROR ENTERS THE WAR ON DRUGS 
Drug trade dynamics in Mexico have proved, in the 
past, not to have needed extreme violence to achieve goals,  
on either sides of the game, the criminals trafficking and 
the state enforcing the law. So, what is wrong with Mexican 
counter-narcotics enforcement recently? Why, over four 
years, has the present war on drugs in Mexico been as 
costly in lives as a medium intensity regular warfare 
conflict? Why are there now paramilitary groups fighting 
openly, in daylight, right in the middle of the most 
important urban centers? And, why are innocent civilians, 
not related to the drug trade, being killed?  
The so called "War on Drugs" in Mexico is a conflict 
that has brought the Mexican State and the Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) operating in Mexico face-to-face. By 
general consensus, the present war on drugs started in 
December 2006 when President Felipe Calderon sent 6,500 
Army troops to support law enforcement forces to contain 
the increasing violence in the central west coast state of 
Michoacán. After that date, the Mexican government's 
strategy against drugs has seemed to be focused in applying 
"all the State's power" to ending drug trafficking in 
Mexico. Since 2006, the death toll related to drug violence 
has increased to a rate not seen in Mexico since the 1910 
Civil War (McCaa, 2003). Drug related violence has reached 
all social sectors in unprecedented levels. Drug 
Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have developed into 
complex and powerful criminal networks. Notwithstanding, 
DTOs are constantly expanding and improving their 
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traditional structures to better administer their 
businesses; now they are adding military arms to their 
organizations in order to compete with rival DTOs and to 
cope with the state's law enforcement efforts. The DTO's 
military arms are being designed to operate as 
decentralized groups to achieve mobility and adaptability 
as military-type units. The current intense government 
anti-drug campaign has resulted in a high number of 
detentions, causing internal hierarchical re-arrangements 
inside DTOs that along with external factors such as 
alliances and splits have increased turf war violence. 
Moreover, some of the original DTO's military arms, 
originally created to support the largest organization, 
have become independent. Now, independent groups with the 
size and organization of small armies are starting to play 
their own roles in the already complex war on drugs. Some 
of these new paramilitary groups are led by Mexican 
military deserters, some of them from elite special 
operations units.  
The DTO's paramilitary groups are growing and are 
quickly adapting to the war on drugs in Mexico. They have 
created fully operational training camps and logistics 
networks, and have acquired advanced weaponry and high-tech 
tactical communications. They have their own ethos, almost 
sectarian, focused on attracting recruits among the younger 
people in Mexico. According to recent studies by the 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, (Autonomous 
National University of Mexico), UNAM, estimates are that 
about 18 million people around 18 years old neither attend 
school or have  jobs (Aviles K., 2010). This sector of the 
young population is being recruited by DTO paramilitary 
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groups with a promise of easy money and power (Informador, 
2010). Another fact is that DTO paramilitary groups’ 
ideology is far from the traditional mafia ideology. There 
is no longer the old rural drug lord providing welfare and 
services to the people living in the towns where they came 
from. Now, they are extremely violent and negotiate less. 
Some of the groups’ founders were professional soldiers 
trained as experts in irregular warfare in some of the 
world's best military training centers and they know how to 
inflict the worst damage possible to their enemies. They 
know what a Psychological Operation is, what it means to 
intimidate the adversary, and they know how to do it at its 
most extreme level. Moreover, within their turf wars, 
everybody between them and their criminal activities is the 
enemy, making no distinctions. Terrorist tactics, such as 
massacres, indiscriminate raids and bombings are being used 
in an increasing rate.     
It can be argued that DTO paramilitary groups are 
using terrorist tactics to psychologically impact the 
general population and law enforcement forces in order to 
influence their decisions and benefit their criminal 
purposes. Nevertheless, organized crime's ultimate goal is 
the profit realized from their illicit activities. And 
because these activities are illicit, they must be kept at 
low visibility. Terrorism leaves signatures, and attracts 
undesirable attention, mainly when it is used in a country 
where terrorism is not common. So, what is the real cost 
and the benefit for criminal networks such as DTOs 
paramilitary groups to opt for terrorism?  
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All DTO paramilitary groups are aiming at highly 
symbolic targets within a society that they know very well 
since they are part of it. They have no political purposes 
at this time, but paradoxically, can operate as guerrillas 
to ambush stronger forces, or as terrorist cells to 
destabilize urban areas.  
Terrorism is a word that is associated with 
totalitarian governments, insurgencies, separatist groups, 
religious violence, asymmetric warfare and extremist 
ideology. It is not easy to relate terrorism and criminal 
violence within a relatively advanced democracy, despite it 
belonging to a developing country. Organized crime is 
morphing in Mexico and it is happening faster than 
enforcement laws and forces designed to contain it can be 
adapted. The DTOs in Mexico are not behaving as they used 
to do. They are applying as many characteristics from 
insurgent and terrorist groups as the achievement of their 
criminal goals seems to require, and with the advantage 
that the vast resources coming from drug trade gives. What 
is most concerning is that the Mexican state and society's 
conditions are allowing it, just as a liquid fluid takes 
the shape of the container that holds it.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION: WHY TERRORISM? 
Drug trafficking organizations are basically criminal 
enterprises. They are typically most involved with 
generating profits by providing drugs to consumers (Hanser, 
Wakeley, Smith, & Wallace, 2008). In Mexico, DTOs have 
developed successfully through the last three decades. They 
set up what Huang (2008) calls the "first type of efficient 
functional establishments"(p. 50) by setting up corruption 
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rings within law enforcement and then political systems. In 
the last decade, the largest DTOs started fragmentizing 
into smaller DTOs that engaged in turf wars. Since December 
2006, the core government administration's policy has been 
to target and disrupt organized crime, mainly DTOs. The 
deeply corrupted systems have made it difficult for the 
state to eliminate DTOs, which in four years of war have 
killed about 1,000 state officials, among them candidates 
for governors, judges, majors, municipal level employees, 
59 journalists, about 200 military and 2,073 policemen. On 
the other hand, jails have increased their population 241% 
with approximately 131,000 inmates indicted. More than 
10,000 criminals were killed in turf wars and about 28,000 
were shot down by federal forces in 963 firefights. Despite 
numbers being on the government's side, the general 
population's perception of security has been seriously 
damaged. Entire towns and small cities in the north have 
been abandoned. Thousands of people have fled their 
residential areas to safer places, even abroad. In border 
cities, such as Matamoros, local periodicals and television 
news broadcasts do not report anything related to DTOs. 
Bombings happen almost every day at TV and radio stations 
and  newspapers. Clubs, bars, restaurants, private parties, 
health centers, service centers have been raided 
indiscriminately with assault rifles' fire. According to 
international comparisons from the World Health 
Organization, Mexico's 11.2 rate of violent homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants is far under the Colombia's 52.5 or 
Venezuela's 31.9 (PAHO/WHO, 2010). Social violence in 
Mexico, at least by statistics, has not required a state of 
emergency in any part of Mexico. However, the population's 
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perspective of safety has already been influenced. The 
terrorist tactics DTOs are applying are psychologically 
impacting Mexican society. Beyond an integrated strategy 
must be launched to successfully cope with the drug trade. 
Law enforcement must use reliable tools to set an 
environment of security and stability in opposition to the 
DTOs’ terror campaigns. Terrorism by DTOs has first to be 
understood in order to be able to counter it successfully.      
B. ORGANIZATION: PAST AND PRESENT OF DRUGS AND 
TERRORISM'S CONVERGENCES IN LATIN AMERICA 
To provide an objective answer for DTO's complex 
terrorism problem the next chapter will review the theory 
about the logic of terrorism and advantages and 
disadvantages of its use, in order to establish a reference 
frame. The review will also be focused on the logic of the 
organized crime structures and dynamics, in order to 
establish a coherent relationship.  
In Chapter III, some previous organizations that 
historically were involved in the drug trade and terrorism 
at the same time, such as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 
in Peru, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) FARC, and the 
Auto-defensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Force 
of Colombia) AUC in Colombia will be outlined. However, 
despite these groups having entered large scale terrorism 
in Latin America, their cases are different from organized 
crime's terrorism explained in this thesis. Therefore, 
Chapter III will continue with a discussion of Pablo 
Escobar's Medellin Cartel,  which  although not designated 
as a terrorist organization was the DTO that introduced 
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terrorism to organized crime in Latin America and is, 
historically, an organization closer to Mexico's current 
phenomena. 
In Chapter IV, the war on drugs in Mexico, starting 
with the history of DTOs in Mexico, their organizations and 
structures and how, when, and why their first military arms 
appeared will be described. Then, a description of the most 
important paramilitary groups, how they have developed and 
how they operate will be presented. It is essential to have 
a clear image of each group since some specific 
characteristics have made some of them more and less prone 
to use terrorism. Another important aspect that must be 
considered is the way they have developed, the differences 
between them, and the organizations they came from. These 
differences will help to better lay out the problem’s 
dynamics. The last part will be a description of the 
state's military response to define what role the Armed 
Forces have in the current drug related violence.     
Chapter V will start with a comparison of the 
historical case and current DTOs paramilitary groups’ use 
of terror in Mexico to outline recurrent and unprecedented 
patterns and produce the answers to what they are and what 
they are not, and when, where, and why they choose 
terrorism. The chapter's conclusion explains what is needed 
and what is available in the Mexican Armed Forces in 
relation to the requirements to successfully counter DTOs 
paramilitary terrorism.  
Government and society in Mexico rely on the Armed 
Forces as the strongest institution that has proved to be 
the least permeable to corruption. There are some important 
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themes beyond the scope of this work that should be 
considered in the big picture. Aspects, other times 
ignored, such as society’s perception of the Armed Forces, 
will not be discussed in depth. However, it is necessary to 
mention that the population's perspective represents 
decisive advantages to the kind of war that is most likely 
to come: the war for people's minds. At the end, terrorism 
is a tactic based on psychological influence; so, it must 
be the society's minds that are the first fortress to 
reinforce. 
C. CONCLUSION: SECURITY IS FIRST 
The answer to the research question sums up many 
factors that merge from all the different sectors of 
Mexican society, which have roots so deep that they cannot 
be seen at first glance. Constant and serious failures in 
politics, foreign policy, and economics had contributed to 
weaken the state and strengthen the society. Drug trade has 
been present for decades, but it has become a national 
security issue in recent years. Drug trade has taken 
advantage of the survival politics' models that Mexican 
governments have applied during the last sixty years 
(Migdal, 1988). At some times, positive indicators such as 
democratic transition, international trade treaties and the 
discovery of important natural resources have built up 
Mexican society's hopes. Nevertheless, in the end, they 
just fed the state's weakening factors, such as corruption, 
nepotism, and partisan division that have caused a failed 
relationship with its own society. Mexico has a strong 
society that is being supported by a weak and outdated 
governing system that is starting to show its lack of 
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balance by undergoing the worst scenarios possible on 
problems that might be controlled. Terrorism-related 
organized crime is one of them. Finally, the institutions 
on which the state relies for the mobilization of public 
forces are the most affected in the DTO problem because 
they were corrupted so long ago that their vulnerability 
reached a breaking point. A state's reliance on its armed 
forces is not a failed strategy, but it must be followed by 
a solution to the social disruption that is feeding the 
destabilizing actors. To comprehend and properly respond to 
organized crime's terrorism in Mexico, the role of the 
armed forces must be changed to one less supportive and 
more active, with an updated and well-defined legal basis, 
to avoid painful lessons learned by other countries in the 
past.       
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II. LANDSCAPE FRAMEWORK: THEORY OF TERRORISM AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
Terrorism is a word that is hard to define. Many 
authors and scholars have tried but there is yet no a 
universal definition. It is said that this is because it is 
a word with a high emotional charge. 
Jeffrey Bale has defined Terrorism as: 
The use or threatened use of violence, directed 
against victims selected for the symbolic or 
representative value, as a means of instilling 
anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, 
and thereby manipulating the perceptions and 
behavior of wider target audiences. 
 For the scope of this thesis, the definition of 
terrorism will be used because it can embrace the Mexican 
federal law's terrorist definition in every article it 
which it is mentioned.  
 Dr. Bale states that the definition of terrorism does 
not have exact boundaries since it had been used broadly in 
politics in a partisan fashion. For this thesis the 
definition will cover acts when the relationship between 
perpetrators, victims, and wider target audiences are 
clear. Other considerations are that sometimes the 
relationship includes more than one target audience to be 
influenced, and that victims are either randomly selected 
or selected by symbolic representation. Terrorism as it is 
punished by law in Mexico will be discussed in Chapter IV 
where the types of DTO paramilitary groups' attacks are 
defined.     
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 Another important distinction to take into 
consideration is the use of the word narco-terrorism. By 
the close relationship between terrorist tactics and the 
drug trade that are described in each case in this work, 
the word comes to mind naturally. Nevertheless it will be 
deliberately avoided in this thesis because it falls victim 
to many ambiguities and different scopes. The term narco-
terrorism's first appearance was when it was used by former 
Peruvian President Fernando Balaunde Terry in the aftermath 
of Shining Path attacks on Peruvian counter-narcotic forces 
in 1983 (Lucero, 2008). The term was broadly used later to 
describe the violence that Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel 
carried out against government targets in the 1980s and 
1990s in Colombia. Now, however, the term is used to 
describe those terrorist groups that use the illegal drug 
trade as their primary funding source. A current and well 
documented case is the FARC in Colombia. The term as 
described in the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary is: 
 Narco-terrorism - Terrorism that is linked to illicit 
drug trafficking (DoD, 2001).  
 It can be noted that this definition embraces two 
activities that have, on their own, countless sub 
divisions. Terrorism can be conducted in any of its 
different types, as state terrorism, religious terrorism, 
or cyber-terrorism, and others that link the world-wide 
drug trafficking network's universe and can refer to a very 
broad classification of groups far away from the criminal 
structures that this thesis will describe. 
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A.  THE LOGIC OF TERRORISM  
A broad theoretical framework has been created since 
terrorism became the primary tactic for groups that use 
violence to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, the 
wide variety of studies on the topic has not yet defined a 
clear profile of the terrorist and his motivations. That 
is, possibly, because terrorism's ultimate goal is to 
influence psychologically, and psychology is a complex and 
subjective field. The terrorist attack is always a violent 
and impacting event. Terrorism is costly for both 
perpetrators and victims, and to exhibit that cost is the 
optimum result desired by the terrorist. For ages, fear 
management has been used in warfare. From painted faces and 
battle-cries to a Stuka's screaming sirens, to instill fear 
in the enemy has been a conventional part of war. However, 
in the irregular warfare that faces asymmetric contenders, 
the fear management, is literally another weapon. As 
invisible as subjective, fear can turn to its maximized 
expression, terror. The "size" of terror waged as a weapon 
can be a substitute for a physically smaller and weaker 
arsenal. Insurgencies, separatist movements and dissident 
groups enter in this field. They may be weak, small and out 
of the standard system, but in their scope of reality, 
without exception, these groups are waging a war. The 
enemies, their causes and ultimate goals can be as 
different as the political and social differences which 
exist among individuals and communities. However,  for 
them, it is a war with its tactical and strategically 
rational decisions. Crenshaw (1990) assumes that in this 
kind of struggle, terrorism is a "resort to violence as a 
willful choice made by an organization for political and 
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strategic reasons rather as the unintended outcome of 
psychological or social factors"(p. 8). The process of 
decision-making within the group, whatever its nature is, 
is bounded, as Crenshaw states, "between two poles: the 
psychological and the strategic, and in between it lays the 
motivations' explanatory landscape for the intentional 
choice"(p. 45). According to Clausewitz (1908), "war is an 
extension of politics," so for these groups, terrorism is 
their way to conduct politics. It can be a change in the 
political situation, a religious posture or a territorial 
split. Whatever the motivation for the struggle is, these 
groups have a clear and legitimate motivation that has made 
them choose violence.  Whether they are legal inside a 
state or social order or not, they match the conventional 
territorial delimitations or not, or if their social order 
is defined by abstract codes such as religion, the ultimate 
goal is to obtain a new status for them within the general 
social and political order. They are not going to invent a 
new political ideology or create a new territory; they just 
want a piece of what already exists, but for their own. 
Terrorists' purposes, enter, perhaps extreme, but well 
delimited boundaries of what Crenshaw calls "a collective 
rational choice"(p. 47). For terrorists that see themselves 
as fighters and as Crenshaw claims "assume to display a 
collective rationality," terrorism is an instrumental 
strategy with a purpose and a clear conceptual process, a 
military tool to fight a war with all what war implies. So, 
why is terrorism sometimes used beyond the violent 
extension of politics? Which mechanisms work inside a 
collective rationality beyond the political struggle, and  
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deep inside a society, when its conception comes from 
highly complex rational organizations such as organized 
crime? 
B. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERROR 
Phil Williams (2008) describes organized crime as,an 
“entity organization whether networked or  higherarchical, 
that systematically adopts criminal activities in pursuit 
of profit as its ultimate objective"(p. 126). He also 
states that crime, as the Clausewitzian definition for war, 
is the extension of business by criminal means. Organized 
crime has existed throughout thistory. Probably it was born 
the same moment conventional transactions were born. It is 
a business system inside a larger and more general business 
system, but that works in the opposite direction. According 
to Williams, its main characteristics are that organized 
crime works as a criminal enterprise, it is pragmatic 
rather than ideological, and if it is involved in political 
activities it is just to protect its own illegal ones. 
Furthermore, because its processes work opposite to 
conventional legal ones, organized crime constantly resorts 
to violence in order to fulfill the lack of market 
regulations. Illegality turns organized crime's enterprises 
vulnerable, mainly to other illegal competitors. As William 
continues, organized crime uses violence to eliminate 
rivals, remove threats, and remove obstacles. So, violence 
is not the ultimate goal of organized crime, it is just a 
tool it applies internally and externally, to regulate the 
business. The criminal procedeeings and networks must be 
complex in order to keep them safe. Organized crime's veil 
that divide its enterprise from the main stream is 
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precisely the clandestinity or the skill to keep its 
activities far from law enforcement’s range. In these 
terms, corruption is another negotiation necessary for the 
enterprise and it has a cost with a benefit. Violence is 
another negotiation with a cost and benefit, most of the 
time a not desirable cost. Violence attracts attention, and 
illegal organizations do not want attention. The most 
succesful criminal enterprises have  been those which have 
kept violence low. If non-violent negotiations were 
effective and efficient, the organization was able to stay 
“under the radar.” Consequently, a low profile asured 
profits to flow steadily over time. This was the case of 
Pablo Escobar’s Medellin cartel's struggle against the Cali 
cartel in Colombia in the 1990s.The extreme violence used 
by Escobar against the state made the Medellin cartel quite 
visible to law enforcement. The Cali cartel was more 
discrete in the use of violent methods and was a better 
negotiator, including its participation in its competitor’s 
brake down. Pablo Escobar engaged in a rampant terrorist 
campaign that undermined the enterprise because, as Kydd 
and Walter (2006) state, "terrorist violence is a form of 
costly signaling by which terrorists attempt to influence 
the beliefs of their enemy and the population they 
represent or wish to control"(p. 52). The cost for 
Escobar's criminal enterprise was higher that the influence 
profits. Illegal enterprises are integrated by a liquid 
capital and by a network capital made of influence that is 
built on trust and corruption. Ultimately, the lack of 
influence profits cut off the financial profits and the 
Medellin cartel went into a general bankruptcy. The state's 
cost for enforcement against the Medellin cartel was also 
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too high in lives and losses of the state's power 
symbols.Terrorism and drugs have had many different 
convergences throughout the recent history of Latin 
America.  Some of those entered the political war and used 
terrorist strategic logistics described by Kydd and Walter 
(2006): attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and 
outbidding (p. 60). Latin America's most important 
terrorist groups engaged in long wars that let them 
challenge the state with many different strategies over 
time, including terrorist campaigns. Organized crime's 
terrorist strategic logistics on the other hand, are not 
the same since criminal enterprises logistics work along 
the state’s power. The state's controls  should be between 
a point where commercial exchange works acceptably and 
where enforcement controls are weak enough to be corrupted. 
A serious disruption of the state is not profitable for a 
criminal enterprise that survives by covertly taking the 
form of the container that holds it.                
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III. TERRORISM AND DRUGS: HISTORICAL CASES IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
A. TERRORISM ENTERS LATIN AMERICA: INSURGENTS AND 
PARAMILITARIES 
Terrorist strategies, as explained, have been used 
broadly in Latin American revolutionary struggles, mainly 
in the last thirty years. The first relationship between 
drugs and terrorism was Peru's insurgent group, Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path). Sendero Luminoso was created in 
Peru as a faction of the Peruvian Communist Party in the 
late 1960s. According to many authors, Shining Path's label 
as a terrorist group is open to discussion. Hazleton and 
Woy-Hazelton (1988) argue, "In Senderos's eyes, the 
terrorist label, applied by the Peruvian government, the 
United States and the Peruvian Left, seeks to discredit and 
isolate its genuine revolution, to hide the people's war" 
(p.63). David Scott Palmer (1994) states that "Shining Path 
uses terror to further its revolutionary ends but is not a 
terrorist movement"(p. 265). Neither source  labels Shining 
Path as a terrorist group because it did  not engage in 
"indiscriminate violence" (Hazelton, 1988),"with no 
political focus"(Palmer, 1994). Sendero Luminoso's rampant 
violence through its insurgent campaign made them, 
regardless of the "revolutionary" personality the movement 
wanted to show, more suitable to fit the majority of the 
current terrorism definitions including Dr. Bale's.  
In 1983, Shining Path became involved in drugs by 
moving its operatives to the Upper Huallaga Valley, the 
world's larger coca producing region. The group claimed it 
would liberate peasants from Peru’s government law 
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enforcement and Colombia’s DTO exploitation (Martin, 2010). 
By taxing DTOs and then by becoming directly involved in 
the drug trade, Sendero Luminoso became one of the 
wealthiest guerrilla movements in modern history.  It 
collected an estimated US$30 million per year until 1992, 
when the leader's group was arrested (Gregory, 2009).  
Another terrorist group that became involved in drugs 
was Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The 
FARC was created in 1964, as the military arm of the 
Communist party in Colombia. In 1983, the FARC's First 
Front took control of coca producing regions in the 
departments (states) of Meta and Guaviare in order to tax 
the coca farmers in those regions (Pulido, 2005). In 2005, 
the Junta de Inteligencia Conjunta de la Republica de 
Colombia (Joint Intelligence Board of the Republic of 
Colombia), JCI, reported the estimated finances of the FARC 
in 2003. The information gathered by Colombian state 
intelligence agencies gave a total estimated maximum income 
of US$1.28 billion from which 45.8% of that, 97% came just 
from drugs. Total expenditures equaled US$250 million, and 
73% of the expenditures went to obtain chemical substances 
and explosives used to carry out terrorist attacks. The 
profit result was about US$1.01 billion (JIC, 2005). The 
FARC profits for 2003 were 28.8% of the Colombian Armed 
Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) budgets all together for 
2005 (Security, 2007). From 2003 to 2010, FARC has been 
blamed for at least nine terrorist bombings on urban areas 
with 71 people killed and hundreds injured. Indiscriminate 
gun raids have killed 119 people, along with the countless 
assassinations and Improvised Explosive Devices and 
personal mines that have terrorized the peasantry in those 
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remote areas where FARC has had a presence (Pulido, 2005). 
The FARC is categorized as a terrorist group by the 
Colombian Government (Office, 2008), as well as the United 
States (USDS, 2010), Canada, and the European Union 
(Pulido, 2005).  
 The last terrorist group largely involved in drugs was 
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC, an extreme-right 
paramilitary group created in 1997 with private capital to 
protect private property from the FARC and other 
guerrillas. The AUC resembled a federation of civil anti-
subversive groups which, according to its leader Carlos 
Castano, were not paramilitaries, but civilians with the 
right to fight the crime of subversion (Castano, 2001). The 
AUC has been pointed to by many Colombian and international 
human rights NGOs as responsible for systematic mass 
killings of civilian targets (HRW, 2000). The AUC was 
officially designated on September 10, 2001 as a foreign 
terrorist organization by the United States Department of 
State (USDS, 2010). Its leader, Carlos Castano, was charged 
with illegally introducing 17 metric tons of cocaine to the 
United States, and in 2004 he was sentenced in absentia by 
Colombia's government for his roles in massacres and mayhem 
(McGirk, 2006).                            
 The three groups were closely linked to organized 
crime in Colombia. Dudley (2004) states that AUC's origins 
came from 1982, when Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel, along 
with land-owners, and some industrial representatives, 
created a self-defense force to protect their properties 
and personal integrity from guerrilla kidnappings: The 
Death to Kidnappers (MAS) death squad (p. 74). That MAS 
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group joined the federation of self-defense forces that 
integrated into the AUC in 1997 (Hanson, 2008). 
B. PLOMO O PLATA (LEAD OR SILVER): PABLO ESCOBAR AND THE 
MEDELLIN CARTEL IN COLOMBIA 
 Violence in Colombia has been an ongoing and extremely 
complex issue. According to Dudley (2004), most of the 
"local revolutions" that have been fought in Latin America 
during the previous century have faced conservative and 
liberal parties (p. 6). The struggle for power in Colombia 
was not an exception, and in 1948 the tension between 
conservatives and liberals escalated in to what is known as 
La Violencia (The Violence). Dudley also claims that "La 
Violencia forms the backdrop to the common use of Political 
Assassinations and every other tale of war in Colombia. It 
also shaped people's form of resistance and struggle"(p. 
7). The patterns acquired by Colombian society towards the 
use of violence are clearly illustrated by the guerrillas, 
the paramilitaries and the DTOs who now have the main role 
in Colombia's conflict. Terrorists in Colombia and Peru 
were born and raised in the middle of a chaotic 
environment. They had their minds shaped by psychological 
forces that, as Jerrold Post (1990) states, "rationalized 
acts that other people were not compelled to commit" such 
as terrorism. For that reason, the leftist guerrillas, the 
private paramilitaries and the DTOs had their own reasons 
to exercise violence in Colombia, rather than negotiate, as 
Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel showed.   
 In the late 1970s, the drug trafficking from South 
America to the United States, the most important consumer 
on the continent, shifted from marijuana (Cannabis Sativa) 
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to cocaine (a psychoactive alkaloid from the coca leaf) 
following the new preferences among consumers (Adolfo 
Aterhotua, 2008). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
reported in 1976 that approximately between 14 and 19 
metric tons of cocaine were smuggled into the United States 
that year (Bruce Bagley, 1990). Three years later, in 1979, 
the total estimate was between 25 and 31 metric tons, and 
by 1980 it easy passed 50 metric tons. A DTO, the Medellin 
cartel was the main supplier (DEA, 2010). According to 
Aterhotua and Rojas (2008) Medellin traffickers were named 
a "cartel" by the DEA in 1982 after a drug seizure in 
Cleveland to better explain the narcotraffickers' alliances 
and to be able to gather all of them into one prosecution 
process(p.13). The term became popular and has been applied 
to every drug trafficking organization since then. For the 
scope of this work, drug cartels created after the Medellin 
and Cali cartels (the second largest cartel created in 
Colombia) will be named Drug Trafficking Organizations 
(DTOs). They now work as one organization with a 
centralized hierarchical or networked structure, different 
from the small syndicates working as federations that 
shared trafficking routes and warehoses in the past. The 
first drug trade organizational coherence changed in the 
late 1980s when other region's traffickers also formed 
their own drug federations as the Cali or Valle cartels 
(Escobar, 2009). With time, every cartel became a sole 
organization with a monolitic higherarchical structure. 
Independent traffickers became part of the bigger 
organizations voluntarily or by force. The drug enforcement 
strikes produced vacuums in the higherarchical structure 
and they modified their operations causing internal and 
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external adjustments, and therefore, the turf and cartel 
wars. These readjustment mechanisms by the use of force, 
caused the DTOs to acquire more and better weapons, even 
more and better than those used by the government. The 
Medellin cartel's most visible leader was Pablo Escobar 
Gaviria, a former car thief, bank robber and kidnapper who 
began in drugs by buying coca paste in Ecuador and 
transporting it by himself to Bogota (Adolfo Aterhotua, 
2008). According to Pablo's brother and the cartel's 
accountant, Roberto Escobar (2009), in the 1980s the demand 
for cocaine suddenly skyrocketed in the United States and 
the Medellin cartel established more dynamic and larger 
shipments, routes, and distribution networks in South 
Florida, California and other parts of the U.S. At one 
point it was estimated that 70 to 80 tons of cocaine were 
being shipped from Colombia to the U.S. every month. At the 
peak of his power, Escobar was shipping to the United 
States, in jetliners, as much as 11 metric tons of cocaine 
per flight (DEA, 2010). The Medellin cartel quickly 
controlled a large portion of the drugs that entered into 
the United States, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican 
Republic. Its cocaine was brought mostly from Peru and 
Bolivia, as Colombian coca was initially of substandard 
quality (Escobar, 2009). The Shining Path's drug activities 
in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley were closely related to the 
Medellin cartel, mostly in the early 1980s when the 
Medellin cartel was expanding and coca producers were 
invited to take their produce to the cartel's warehouses in 
Colombia to be shipped to the United States (Steinitz, 
2002). The customs authorities were still unaware of the 
drug trade because of the unsophisticated enforcement 
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mechanisms in North America. In the first years of 
smuggling, the cartel received large amounts of revenues in 
cash (Escobar, 2009). Pablo Escobar was quickly known as a 
wealthy entrepreneur with a good rapport with local poor 
people in Medellin. The people, who received money and many 
benefits such as roads, schools, and entertainment centers, 
used to see Pablo Escobar as a sort of Robin Hood. 
Escobar’s behavior received a payoff in the support and 
esteem of the population (Guillen, 2007). In 1982, Escobar 
was elected as a deputy/alternative representative to the 
Chamber of Representatives of Colombia's Congress, as part 
of the Colombian Liberal Party (Guillen, 2007). Escobar's 
seat in the congress was a result of the financing he had 
been contributing to liberal party congressmen since the 
late 1970s. Escobar's troubled financing was stated by 
journalist Gonzalo Guillen (2007) when he met him as part 
of the Colombian political group invited to attend the 
Felipe Gonzales Socialist Party's victory in Spain. A 
violent modus operandi started to identify Escobar's 
dealings, either with his criminal colleagues or with the 
State powers he rapidly began to infiltrate. Corruption and 
intimidation characterized Pablo Escobar's dealings with 
the Colombian system. He had an effective, inescapable 
policy in dealing with law enforcement and the government, 
referred to as "plata o plomo," (literally silver or lead, 
colloquially [accept] money or [face] bullets) (Bowden, 
2001). This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of 
individuals, including civilians, policemen, and state 
officials. At the same time, Escobar bribed countless 
government officials, judges and other politicians (Bruce 
Bagley, 1990). The Medellin cartel leader's boundless 
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campaign of corruption and intimidation reached a tipping 
point when Supreme Court Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla 
pointed publicly Pablo Escobar's illegal source of income, 
as the leader of the Medellin Cartel (Hylton, 2008). As a 
consequence, Escobar was expelled from the Liberal Party 
and started to be known as a dangerous criminal instead of 
the wealthy businessman he wanted to seem to be. Justice 
Lara Bonilla promoted the legislation needed to establish 
an extradition law for those committing drug related crimes 
because the justice system was drowning in corruption and 
Colombian judges feared to prosecute drug traffickers. An 
extradition law would allow drug traffickers to be 
prosecuted in any foreign country, including the United 
States, thus guaranteeing a cleaner process and a sure 
imprisonment (Bruce Bagley, 1990).  
The response to the extradition threat made Pablo 
Escobar opt for violence against the government officials, 
pushing them to declare the extradition law as 
unconstitutional (Adolfo Aterhotua, 2008). In April 1982 a 
17-year-old hitman, hired by the Medellin cartel, shot 
Justice Lara Bonilla to death in Bogota (Escobar, 2009). 
After the assassination, President Belisario Betancourt 
approved the extradition law, thus beginning the most 
violent period of the Medellin cartel. 
1. Medellin Cartel's Hitmen and Paramilitary Groups 
In 1981, the Colombian Insurgent group 19 de marzo 
(March 19) or M-19, kidnapped Jorge Luis Ochoa's sister, 
Marta Nieves Ochoa. Jorge Luis Ochoa was one of the 
Medellin cartel's founders along with Gilberto and Miguel 
Rodriguez Orijuela, Carlos Lehder, Jose Santacruz, Gustavo 
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Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar (Adolfo Aterhotua, 2008). 
Instead of paying the ransom for Ochoa's sister, the 
Medellin cartel called 223 mafia kingpins for a meeting 
where each agreed to contribute US$200,000.00 and ten of 
their best hitmen to create a private counter-kidnapper 
group (Escobar, 2009). They called the group Muerte a 
Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers), MAS (Adolfo 
Aterhotua, 2008). This meeting was a key episode in 
Colombian violence's history. Many other landowners in the 
region were victims of kidnappings and extortions by the 
guerrillas. Some authors, as among them Doug Stokes (2005), 
claim that among the attendants to the meeting were 
representatives of the private sector (oil companies) and 
the military who was interested of self-defense forces as 
counter-insurgent measures. In just fifteen days, the MAS 
group captured 25 M-19 members and liberated Ochoa's sister 
without making any payment to the kidnappers. The group did 
not stop there and continued fighting the M-19, killing, 
capturing and turning in its members to Colombian 
authorities (Paulino Marca, 1995). This group was the 
foundation of the later paramilitary groups in Colombia. 
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, one of the Escobar partners, 
was interested in the development of MAS and he personally 
funded the training and weapons for the group. He was 
recognized as a leader in the MAS group, and later, along 
with Fidel and Carlos Castano, in the self-defense 
paramilitaries that resulted in the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) (Dudley, 2004).       
 The MAS group was successful in fighting and 
frightening guerrilla groups that were a threat to the 
narco's properties and trafficking facilities, such as 
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clandestine runways and laboratories (Hylton, 2008). In 
1984, after the first criminals were extradited to foreign 
countries, the Medellin cartel organized a series of 
violent retaliation attacks in behalf of a group of 
criminals who called themselves Los Extraditables (The 
Extraditable ones), and who, according to Dario Villamizar 
(1995), used groups of young hitmen hired from the lower 
social strata in Medellin, the people whose minds and 
hearts the cartel had won in earlier years.They were later 
trained as a military arm. According to the New York Times 
(1987), Los Extraditables fought the extradition policy 
with more than threats and bribes. They claimed 
responsibility for murdering, thirty judges, twenty 
journalists and thousands of police officers in three years 
(Katherine Roberts, 1987). Nevertheless, incorruptible 
government forces responded to Los Extraditables' violence 
and threats with an intense use of force. The government 
operations resulted in 11,000 criminal arrested; 467 
properties inspected; 1,313 vehicles, 346 aircraft, 28 
boats, and more than 1,000 weapons confiscated (Paulino 
Marca, 1995). The escalation in violence required the 
cartel to use its paramilitary forces that were, by that 
time, strongly organized and operating under Rodriguez 
Gacha’s sponsorship. Other cartel partners such as the 
Rodriguez Orijuela brothers started hiring former 
professional military, both national and foreign, to 
increase their military capabilities (Robinson, 1989). 
 In 1989, the military expertise capabilities injected 
into the cartel's paramilitary groups were more evident. 
The intimidation campaign run by the cartel turned to 
terrorism. From 1989 to 1993, the Medellin cartel was 
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responsible for 118 bombings killing 324 people and 
injuring 1,265, and nearly 3,000 selected assassinations. 
The selected assassinations included three presidential 
candidates, journalists, judges, high ranking military 
officers, and 2,976 police officers (Paulino Marca, 1995). 
The terrorist campaign included an attack on Avianca Flight 
203. A Boeing 727 airliner with 107 passengers and crew 
aboard exploded while on route from Bogota to Cali killing 
all passengers, crew and three people on the ground (FSF, 
2010). In another terrorist attack, the Medellin cartel 
used a school bus loaded with approximately a half metric 
ton of jelly dynamite to strike the Departamento de 
Administracion de Seguridad DAS (Colombian Intelligence 
Administration) headquarters in Bogota. The explosion 
killed 100 including children in a care center, and injured 
950 people(Paulino Marca, 1995). It was the biggest car-
bomb ever exploded outside the Middle East (Hylton, 2008). 
It is alleged by Colombian intelligence sources that 
Escobar backed the 1985 storming of the Colombian Supreme 
Court by left-wing guerrillas from the 19th of April 
Movement (M-19), which resulted in the murder of half the 
judges on the court. Some of these claims were included in 
a late 2006 report by a Truth Commission of three judges of 
the current Supreme Court. At the time of the siege, the 
Supreme Court was studying the constitutionality of 
Colombia's extradition treaty with the U.S. (Jorge Anibal 
Gomez, 2006) 
In 1989, Rodriguez Gacha was killed and Fidel Castano 
became the paramilitaries' leader. Many of the former 
foreign and national military were hired by Cali's cartel 
and many Medellin traffickers joined other cartels or ended 
 30
negotiating surrender with the government (Bowden, 2001). 
In 1991, Pablo Escobar himself and nine of his most trusted 
men, surrendered to the government under some special 
conditions: to be imprisoned in a special jail, with only 
police guarding the jail, and with his family's security 
guaranteed (Escobar, 2009). The same day a new legal 
amendment forbidding extradition was adopted by the Supreme 
Court (Adolfo Aterhotua, 2008). The Medellin cartel's 
terrorist strategy received its payoffs. However, the 
government knew that within a short time Pablo Escobar was 
running the cartel from inside the jail. The government 
planned to transfer him to another facility (Paulino Marca, 
1995). Pablo Escobar feared the transfer and escaped from 
jail in August 1992. Pablo Escobar retaliated violently 
against everyone in the cartel he thought had betrayed him. 
He included anyone who tried to flee the cartel, which was 
cracking from inside out(Bowden, 2001). Among those former 
partners now hunted down by Escobar was Fidel Castano, the 
leader of "Los Tangueros", a paramilitary group that 
terrorized the north of Colombia in the late 1980s. 
Castano, the Ochoa brothers and some former military that 
were also persecuted created a group called "Los Pepes" 
(Spanish acronym for People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) to 
defend themselves from the Medellin cartel (Hylton, 2008). 
This group used the same tactics that Pablo Escobar had 
used and set many bombs on Escobar's properties (Bowden, 
2001). 
The government created a special group with U.S. 
trained elite Colombian police officers called "Bloque de 
Busqueda" (Search Bloc) that mounted one of the largest man 
hunts in history. More than 600 troops were killed by Pablo 
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Escobar's hitmen before he was finally found and shot down 
in a security house in Medellin (Paulino Marca, 1995). 
There are allegations about the participation of Los Pepes 
in the hunt for Escobar due to their sharing information 
with the Colombian National Police (Bowden, 2001). A fact 
is that one of Los Pepes leaders, Fidel Castano, was later 
the founder of the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba 
and Uraba, the paramilitary group that later became the 
United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the terrorist 
group that spread terror and violence in Colombia in the 
late 1990s (Hanson, 2008). 
E. CONCLUSION: A COMMON CENTER OF GRAVITY 
It has been established in this chapter that even when 
the three historical cases were different in time and 
space, there were some factors that all had in common. The 
first one is the drug trade, more specifically the cocaine 
trade and its potential to fund any illegal organization. 
Second is that each case represents different aspects of 
the endemic social disequilibrium that prevails in most of 
the Latin American countries and that is an essential 
condition for dissident groups to arise and develop. Third 
is the state's political partisan divisionism that makes it 
difficult to delegitimize any terrorist activity, since 
there are still sectors of society which, as Crenshaw 
states,” psychologically benefit in their collective 
rational."  
Moreover, there is the drug factor a source of 
funding. Peru's Shining Path and the FARC found a golden 
well in the cocaine trade that let them grow dangerously, 
and let them also approach unaware and unprepared security 
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forces. It is a reality that, as Luis Villamarin (2005) 
states, the dark and complex drug networks, quite more 
sophisticated that in the 1980s, represents the underground 
well where many different networks like tree roots can 
easily connect and feed. The drug trade, as a global 
problem, is naturally embedded to an offer and demand 
process. Insurgents and terrorists have opened their drug 
trade branches since they represent the most profitable 
illegal business on the continent. It has been said that 
even their ideologies shift slowly to the raw capitalist 
style drug trade. Nevertheless, step by step, Peru and 
Colombia's governments responded to terrorist threats more 
by a “rule of thumb” system than by solid counter-terrorist 
strategy. The financing source for terrorists, as 
Bierstecker and Eckerd (2008) state, is not just their fuel 
but their firm also. By tracing the paths of the funding 
after an attack, it can be easier to track down the 
perpetrators, techniques used, and all the information 
needed to a intelligently attack a network. The Medellin 
cartel was not the exception. The Colombian enforcement 
authorities were reaching a tipping point due to the deep 
corruption. The weakened government institutions were 
making the state weak too. The Medellin cartel was an 
organized crime enterprise that did not invented something 
new. As any enterprise, mainly with so vast and 
uncontrolled profits, it grew as far as the surrounding 
competitors allowed it. Then, the Colombian state should 
have acted as a competitor rather than as a suppressor. At 
the end the state's capability to absorb terrorist attacks' 
effects will discourage terrorists to spend more efforts on 
targeting the same way. Nevertheless, organized crime 
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learns too and can be adaptable. Mexico’s organized crime's 
case is ongoing currently with escalating violence. 
Terrorism is being used now in Mexico. It is essential to 
determine if there is any similarity to the historical 
lessons presented in order to apply and manage Mexico’s 
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IV. MEXICO'S WAR ON DRUGS 
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS’ (DTO) DEVELOPMENT IN 
MEXICO 
Contraband and corruption have been an historical 
problem for Mexican society since the 19th century. Illegal 
commerce of foreign products was common in the main ports 
of Mexico. Walther Bernecker (1993) claims that customs 
officials and other authorities' low salaries caused 
systematic corruption in commerce controls of the ports (p. 
394). Briberies opened entire "alternate" log books to the 
merchant loads coming from Europe or Asia. Luxury items 
forbidden in Mexico were the most popular contraband 
entering the country (p. 395) Government contraband 
enforcement efforts in the mid 1800s made smugglers change 
their operating ports to the north where the centralist 
government had a low or non-existent presence. Ports such 
as Mazatlan or Guaymas on the Pacific coast became an 
optimum option for illegal imports and, as it were learned 
later, for illegal exports too (Mayo, 2006).  
The Northwestern territories' main activity was 
mining. According to United States diplomat Joel R. Poisset 
(1824), an estimated value of smuggling imports were about 
US $4.5 million, and gold and silver bars exported about US 
$2.5 million (p. 33).  Most of the minerals illegal 
exportation left from Mazatlan and Guaymas, in the states 
of Sinaloa and Sonora (Mayo, 2006). The introduction of the 
railroad after 1880 consolidated the contraband networks 
connecting the Mexican Northwest coast with the United 
States’ territories beyond the post Mexican-American War 
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Rio Grande border division (Ramirez, 2009). In 1886, 
President Porfirio Diaz decreed the Foreign Nationals and 
Naturalization Law, which allowed foreigners to enter the 
largely uninhabited Northwest of Mexico. Railroad 
construction had brought many Chinese immigrants as workers 
to that region. From 1886 to 1930 an estimated 30,000 
Chinese immigrants entered Mexico and settled mainly in the 
Northwest coast states. As many of them had fled from the 
England-China opium wars, Chinese immigrants introduced 
techniques for growing  poppies (papaveraceae family) and 
extracting the alkaloid gum that produces opium and many 
narcotics used in pharmaceuticals, such as morphine 
(Ramirez, 2009). The mining industry in Mexico's Northwest 
fell into a crisis after 1920. Violence from the Civil War, 
the drop in metals’ prices and labor union problems caused 
an important number of mines to shut down (Aguilar, 1997). 
Metals’ smuggling was diminished as a consequence and 
contraband networks had to shift to other profitable 
products. As an example, the Prohibition Law in the United 
States made alcohol one of these profitable goods and 
psychoactive drugs were another option (Ramirez, 2009). 
According to Doctor Samuel Ojeda Gastelum from El Colegio 
de Jalisco, many Chinese immigrants who had settled in 
Sinaloa Sierra, started to grow poppies and produce opium 
gum that after 1939 began to be illegally exported to the 
United States by the already well organized smuggling 
networks in Sonora and Sinaloa (Cabrera J. L., 2007). At 
that time, commercialization of hard drugs was prohibited 
in Mexico and the United States. Marijuana and poppies were 
the only crops cultivated in Mexico. Coca did not yet exist  
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there. The main trafficking product was opium because 
marijuana’s generalized consumption began later, in the 
1960s (Astorga). 
1. The First Generation  
a. The Golden Triangle 
The region of Sinaloa is known as drug 
trafficking’s birthplace in Mexico. Before the 1960s, drug 
trafficking was focused on the opium produced in the 
isolated Sierra areas where the climate was ideal for the 
poppies’ growth. Marijuana (Cannabis Indica) was also 
cultivated in the same areas (Astorga, 1996). Marijuana, 
due to climate conditions, can grow in most of the Mexico's 
North and Central West territories; however, the Sierra 
region were poppies were cultivated was also ideal for 
marijuana as was far from supervision by authorities 
(Astorga). The people that used to grow and trade in opium 
were known as "gomeros" in relation to the word "goma" that 
translates to gum, as opium was known in Sinaloa. After the 
1960s there was an important increase in marijuana 
consumption, mainly in the United States, and the former 
"gomeros" shifted to growing and smuggling marijuana. 
(Astorga, 1996). Marijuana was easy to grow and pack and it 
started to be produced in large quantities.  
In 1968, Look magazine estimated marijuana 
smuggling from Mexico to the United States at around 3.5 to 
5 tons per week (Astorga). The marijuana smugglers were a 
new breed of traffickers. For years gomeros had worked 
among the contraband networks that had well established 
free passages through corrupt authorities. The old gomeros 
were ranchers and farmers, people from the countryside that 
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did not rely on violence to run their businesses (Astorga, 
1996). However, the new trafficking generation started to 
use mafia style violence and disrupted the established 
contraband networks to impose their own. Young and better 
educated, they stopped being gomeros to establish the first 
drug trafficking organizations. The first DTO was founded 
by Pedro Aviles Perez, a physician from Durango state 
(Astorga, 1995). In the early 1960s, Aviles moved to 
Sinaloa and established his own drug trafficking 
organization with his own structure and networks. Aviles’ 
organization had a defined structure that started to work 
independently from the traditional networks. It had a 
treasurer, Ernesto Fonseca; a crops supervisor, Rafael 
Caro; a liason in charge of negotiatiations with 
enforcement authorities, a former Police officer Miguel 
Angel Felix; a transportation manager and supervisor, 
Manuel Salcido, and many other minor workers with specific 
roles (Astorga, 1995). Aviles’ revenues were invested and 
laundered on local infrastructure in theregion. He paved 
roads, gave money for schools, and helped people without 
jobs. He was known as a kind of patriarch and earned the 
support of the people when drug trafficking culture was not 
a synonym of violence.There were no moral judgements about 
drugs, they just become another commercial activity.  
The low rate of drug consumption in the rural 
areas were so low that there  was no perception of  drugs 
damaging the population. Violence was usually related with 
police agents or the military, whose local highest ranking 
officers, far from centralist government supervision,  
often were despotic an authoritarian (Astorga, 1995).  
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With time, heroin, a drug processed from poppy 
gum, became popular too, and was cultivated in the same 
area. Marijuana and poppy crops grew exponentially, and 
were extended through the Sierra beyond Sinaloa state's 
borders into Durango and Sonora. The area formed a triangle 
that was known by locals as the “Golden Triangle” because 
of the high profits the drug trade started bringing to the 
region (Astorga, 1996). The increase in drug production 
worried the government and in 1977 it launched a joint 
Federal Attorney - Military  eradication program called 
Operation Condor (Toro, 1995). Operation Condor's target 
was the Golden Triangle zone. Ten thousand Mexican Army 
troops were deployed to track and destroy drug crops. 
Federal Attorney agents targeted the urban centers around 
the Golden Triangle to track and arrest the new drug lords 
and the corrupt officials involved (Toro, 1995). In 1978, 
Aviles was killed in a shootout with police officers. His 
closest collaborators fled the area to the neighboring 
state of Jalisco, to its capital city Guadalajara. Ernesto 
Fonseca, as the leader, along with Miguel Angel Felix, 
Rafael Caro, and Manuel Salcido settled and made 
connections with the cocaine providers in South America and 
started smuggling the alkaloid to the United States 
(Astorga, 1996). In 1984, DEA U.S. undercover officer 
Enrique Camarena was killed in Guadalajara and the Mexican 
Federal Government turned against Fonseca's organization. 
Ernesto Fonseca and Rafael Caro were arrested, and found 
guilty of Camarena's assasination, among other charges. 
Manuel Salcido was killed by Colombian gunmen over a 
cocaine shipment dispute. Miguel Angel Felix, as the new 
leader, divided the organization into key corridor zones in 
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order to enhace the smuggling's efficiency and to 
compartmentalize it. He commisioned Guadalajara to Aviles's 
nephew, Joaquin Guzman; Tijuana, Baja California to his own 
nephew, Benjamin Arellano; and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua  to 
Fonseca's nephew. Amado Carrillo. In 1989, Miguel Angel 
Felix was arrested and the organization's leadership went 
to Joaquin Guzman (Beith, 2010). Nevertheless, the zone 
managers formed their own drug trafficking organization 
empowering themselves in their corresponding areas. For 
that time on, drug trafficking changed it shape and every 
adjustment by the new leaders would be accompanied by 
embedded violence. 
b. The Gulf Corridor 
The Aviles' Drug Trafficking Organization on the 
Mexican Pacific coast developed parallel and geographically 
opposite to another powerful and less visible organization 
in the Gulf of Mexico.  
According to the United States/Mexico 
International Boundary and Water Commission, the border's 
total length is 1,969 miles (3, 169 km), and shares 42 
border crossings. It is the world's most frequently crossed 
border with an estimate of 250 miilion people legally 
crossing it per year (SRE, 2010). San Diego-Tijuana, on the 
Pacificand Brownsville-Matamoros,on the Gulf of Mexicoare 
the two largest metropolitan areas that share a common 
border.  
Dynamic border crossings made them ideal for 
contraband, too. In 1930 the prohibition law in the United 
States had made alcohol profitable goods to smuggle from 
Mexico. Juan Guerra Cardenas was a smuggler from Matamoros, 
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Tamaulipas who illegally transported Mezcal (liquor made 
from the Agave plant, the same as Tequila) to exchange for 
tires he would sell on the Mexico side. With the 
prohibition law, he started smuggling whiskey, tobacco, and 
marijuana (Peralta, 2001). In the late 1950s, as Peralta 
states (2001), the shipments were larger and Cardenas hired 
many people to take the shipments into the United States 
while he stayed in Mexico. He hired one of his nephews, 
Juan Garcia Abrego, who was a car thief, as a shipping 
supervisor. Garcia Abrego improved his uncle's smuggling 
network and in the 1980s started introducing cocaine 
through Brownsville. Garcia Abrego, as Guerra Cardenas did, 
invested important parts of the revenues in corrupting 
authorities. The cocaine shipments were negotiated with the 
Cali cartel,  
The high quantities invested in bribes toward 
government official at all levels kept the organization in 
Mexico invisible and growing (Camin, 2009). In 1987, Guerra 
Cardenas attended the meeting where Miguel Angel Felix 
compartmentalized the drug trade in Mexico, although Guerra 
Cardenas had always worked independently. and 
(Blancornelas, 2002). In the early 1990s, Garcia Abrego 
expanded his organization to the neighboring cities of 
Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo and the major sea ports on the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean in Veracruz and Progreso 
(Blancornelas, 2002). Drug trafficking was now based on a 
fleet of trailer trucks. Osiel Cardenas Guillen,from 
Matamoros joined the Garcia Abrego organization as a 
trailer mechanic. He rapidly earned the leader's trust and 
escalated in rank (Blancornelas, 2005). Juan Guerra 
Cardenas' health was deteriorating due to diabetes and 
 42
Garcia Abrego took over the organization's leadership. 
According to Peter Lupsha (1995), in 1993, the United 
States Federal Government indicted an American Express Bank 
branch in California for laundering US$100 million from 
Garcia Abrego's organization. The investigation found that 
Garcia's network was deeply rooted in the Gulf, smuggling 
an estimated 300 metric tons of cocaine per year. Mexico's 
General Attorney estimated that Garcia's network was worth 
US$10 billion (p. 87). In 1996, Garcia Abrego was arrested 
and extradited to the United States and incarcerated in a 
Federal Prison in Colorado (Astorga). After Garcia's trial, 
Osiel Cardenas Guillen, the former trailer mechanic, 
reached the top of the organization and became leader by 
assassinating other possible members of the organization 
that could substitute for Garcia Abrego (Blancornelas, 
2005). The organization started to be known as The Gulf 
cartel. 
2. The Second Generation: The Colombian Connection 
The drug trade was compartmentalized in 1987 as a 
measure to keep the business dynamic, even if top leaders 
were to be arrested as had happened to the first generation 
of traffickers. Nevertheless, what really happened was the 
opposite. Instead of a drug trafficking synergy, the 
divisions turned to independent drug trafficking 
organizations which grew and became empowered by a new 
shift in the cocaine trade. Instead of being intermediaries 
in the cocaine route from South America to the United 
States, Mexican DTOs became main providers and started to 
control the entire cocaine network. In the first 
generation, Miguel Angel Felix met Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, 
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a member of the Medellin cartel and main supporter of the 
MAS (Muerte A Secuestradores [Death to Kidnappers]),in 
Sinaloa (Blancornelas, 2009). An agreement made was that 
cocaine shipments were to be transported to the United 
States by the Mexican DTOs with a twenty to thirty percent 
tax, arguing that shipments would had a safe route through 
opium and marijuana established networks (Poppa, 1998). The 
business was so profitable that compartmentalized new DTOs 
grew quickly and became so powerful by corrupting and re-
investing drug revenues that by the mid 1990s Colombian 
DTOs had no choice but to adjust themselves to Mexican DTOs 
conditions (Astorga). The DTO controlling the Ciudad 
Juarez-El Paso crossing in Chihuahua and Texas was headed 
by Amado Carillo Fuentes, Ernesto Fonseca's nephew. He was 
known as "the lord of the skies" because he owned a fleet 
of 27 Boeing 727s which he used to ship the cocaine from 
Colombian soil directly to the United States  (Poppa, 
1998). In 1997, the Counter-Narcotics Czar in Mexico, 
General Jesus Gutierrez, was indicted charged with 
protecting the Ciudad Juarez DTO. At Carrillo Fuentes' 
death in the same year 1997, Carrillo Fuentes was charged 
by the U.S. DEA for laundering US$ 20 million ; however, 
the Federal Attorney in Mexico estimated the Ciudad Juarez 
DTO was making US$200 million per week and taking 10% just 
for bribes (Poppa, 1998). 
The empowering rate, the growth and the expansion of 
Mexican DTOs, along with the back up each DTO had from 
corrupted offcials faced a conflict  of interests with 
violence as the solution. With the end of the drug trade's 
original monopoly, each DTO started to compete for  
hegemony on trafficking routes, key shipping nodes and 
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influence on governments officials. With the absence of 
commercial controls for drug trafficking DTOs started 
pushing to secure their own interests by deterrence. 
Therefore, the war on drugs was triggered.                        
3. The Third Generation: Paramilitary Capacity 
The second generation of DTOs came directly from the 
first generation’s monopoly bloc. As most of the first 
leaders came from the same regions and belonged to closely 
related families, the regional, family and cultural ties 
shaped the drug trade in Mexico. Violence was embedded with 
drugs. However, violence among first DTOs was limited to 
selected assassinations. A non- written honor code ruled 
the behavior of the drug lords. Along with money 
laundering, they used to seek social acceptance and 
provided welfare and a sense of justice in areas where they 
operated. If violence was used, it was executed by members 
of that DTO. The general civilian population was never 
forced to support DTO activities.  
In the late 1990s, Sinaloa and Tijuana DTOs were at 
war for the control of routes and influence. Nevertheless, 
the general population knew about turf war violence from 
police notes in the media. Shootouts, although often 
involving the use of Armed Forces' exclusive weapons, were 
isolated cases of a well-defined problem: the “narco” 
culture. The narco culture was known as violent and 
extravagant, but with well demarcated boundaries among 
society. 
In 1999, the new Gulf DTO leader Osiel Cardenas 
decided to hire a corrupted military officer, temporarily 
commissioned in the Federal Police, Arturo Decenas 
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(Grayson, 2008). Cardenas was afraid of his enemies within 
his own DTO. He was known to have killed many of the higher 
ranked members in order to obtain leadership for himself. 
Inside his own DTO, he was known as “El mata amigos” (The 
friends' killer) (Blancornelas, 2005). Decenas was asked to 
gather a security force of former Army soldiers and 
deserters (Grayson, 2008). Decenas had a force of 31 ex-
military.Some of them were already members of Cardenas' 
DTO. Four of the ex-military were former Special Forces 
with counter-insurgency training. They were in charge of 
the group's training. Decenas adopted the coded call sign 
designated for high ranking officers in the Federal Police, 
Z, and were called Los Zetas, the Zs. (Grayson, 2008).        
B. DTO'S PARAMILITARY GROUPS 
Los Zetas structure and organization was a turning 
point for the war on drugs in Mexico. The drug trade 
problem, embedded in Mexico's deepest problems as a state 
and as society, followed a spiraling path from mid-20th 
century clandestine contraband to an uncontrolled violent 
rampage of open crime. The drug trade existed worldwide. 
The vast source of economic power that its trade created 
affected countries different ways. The degree of affect 
depended on the strength the state. Los Zetas, and later 
groups, have evolved into paramilitary groups for different 
reasons from those paramilitaries that evolved in Colombia. 
The reasons in Mexico are due more to the state’s side than 
to the DTOs. Los Zetas and other DTO military arms that use 
violence as a means to commit crimes, terrorize the 
population, and defy the state, were not born as a drug 
trade necessity. Drug trade dynamics require what one of 
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the first generation's drug lords, Juan Esparragoza, said 
that the drug trade just needs a few willing and smart 
people; drugs and arms, and violence, do not match; it is 
well known that it ends badly.  
Drug trade can exist due to a lack of integrated law, 
lack of other financial opportunities and societal programs 
at country levels. Paramilitaries, whatever the reason they 
exist, happen for a lack of a state's basic characteristic 
to effectively monopolize the use of force.              
1. Struggle for Power and Territory 
In the Pacific, the compartmentalized DTOs started to 
fight each other for territory and influence. Each city was 
called a “plaza.”A plaza is a commercial agreement between 
the authorities of a city and specific enterprises or 
companies to prevail among other competing brands. The DTOs 
considered the corruption and co-option of authorities in a 
city as these agreements. Although DTOs were 
compartmentalized into dynamic networks, the networks 
started to work too independently which resulted in a clash 
of interests. In the Gulf, Los Zetas rapidly became a 
powerful tool for Osiel Cardenas' DTO. Its military tactics 
were far more violent and effective than that of other 
DTOs. and the group started to deter forces supporting 
neighboring DTOs. Cardenas, a criminal with a tough 
psychological profile, targeted other territories and 
networks in order to expand his influence. The government 
became concerned about the power that Osiel Cardenas’ DTO 
had and that it was an Army-trained led operation. He was 
arrested in Matamoros. In 2007 Cardenas was extradited to 
the United States to face charges in Texas. Los Zetas 
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continued to be well organized as an autonomous body. The 
Gulf DTO leadership was taken over by Osiel Cardenas' 
brother Ezequiel Cardenas, and a former municipal police 
officer Jorge Costilla. However, Los Zetas was already 
growing; by 2006 the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration estimated 300 gunmen. The other DTOs in 
Mexico started hiring their own security personnel or 
military arms, mainly from former municipal and state 
policemen. Groups as Los Negros (The Blacks), Los Linces 
(The Lynxes), FEDA (Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo [Arturo's 
Special Forces]) and Los Escorpiones (The Scorpions) were 
all created by DTOs to counter Los Zetas.   
2. Los Zetas 
Los Zetas, created as a personal guard for Osiel 
Cardenas, was a group of 31 individuals with a single 
leader that reported directly to Cardenas. With time, the 
group grew and was trusted with more tasks to take 
advantage of their military skills. Among these tasks were 
the security of the drugs and weapons' warehouses, the 
security of the shipments on route, the collection of debts 
and the assassinations ordered by Cardenas. The group 
continued to recruit and built training camps and started 
new recruits in military skills. In 2002, Guzman Decena was 
killed. The next year, Osiel Cardenas was arrested and the 
Gulf DTO suffered confusion among its leaders. Most of them 
hid or fled the area. Los Zetas became more independent.  
 Nuevo Laredo is the most western border city in 
Tamaulipas and it is just 150 miles from Monterrey, the 
third largest and the second most industrial city in 
Mexico. Its closeness to Monterrey makes the Nuevo Laredo 
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border crossing key because of its commercial flow. After 
Cardenas was arrested, the DTO from Sinaloa under Joaquin 
Guzman Loera’s leadership sent 200 gunmen to control the 
drug trafficking on Nuevo Laredo. The Gulf DTO was weak and 
divided and the only way to keep the control was to employ 
Los Zetas. At that time Los Zetas was about 200 gunmen, 
focused on security tasks throughout Tamaulipas. After Los 
Zetas leader was killed by the Army, another former 
military, Heriberto Lazcano, took control. Lazcano had been 
a corporal in the Army Infantry branch. Nevertheless, he 
organized the group and focused it to fight a war in Nuevo 
Laredo against the Sinaloa DTO members. Outnumbered and 
without much capital since the Gulf DTO was disorganized, 
Lazcano distributed US$3,000 to each Los Zetas member and 
ordered them buy cocaine from Gulf DTO providers and sell 
it across the border. They also started taxing, kidnapping, 
extorting and assaulting. They engaged in every criminal 
activity that could give them money for their war. Los 
Zetas allowed the Gulf DTO to keep certain control in the 
eastern area while fighting in Nuevo Laredo. Lazcano 
organized a solid structure with its own intelligence 
network, logistics, and sophisticated communications. The 
group had their own training camps in three states. They 
also hired Guatemalan Special Forces deserters that joined 
them in training. Los Zetas formed alliances with the 
Sinaloa DTO's rivals. In 2008 some Los Zetas cells went to 
Michoacán state and trained a vigilante pseudo-religious 
group called La Familia. La Familia was created in the 
1990s as a vigilante group that tried to spread their own 
vision of religion and justice. Their ideology included 
eliminating vices and delinquency in the towns where they 
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started to operate, including those controlled by the 
Pacific DTOs. Los Zetas trained them and thus opened a new 
front in the south in order to split the Sinaloa DTOs 
forces and weaken them. Lazcano not only had a clear 
tactical organization, but also a strategic vision.  
In 2010, Gulf DTO leaders agreed to a ceasefire with 
the Sinaloa DTO because violence was not succeeding and was 
weakening the groups against Federal enforcement. However, 
because Los Zetas was well organized by itself Lazcano 
rejected any agreement. With its alliances with Sinaloa 
rival factions, its large criminal networks, and  by 
trafficking drugs by itself, (along with  transnational 
networks, as N'Dranguetta's) Los Zetas became so powerful 
that it split from the Gulf DTO and became a DTO by itself; 
a new DTO with an unprecedented shape, organization and 
dynamics. 
Los Zetas is networked by plazas. Each plaza has its 
own network and each plaza's leader reports directly to 
Lazcano. The group has an intelligence network integrated 
with surveillance personnel disguised as vendors, taxi 
drivers, and prostitutes. Everything about federal forces 
or rival DTOs is reported. The group has a special body 
called “La direccion” (The Headmaster's office) that 
controls all communications within the organization along 
with other tasks such as electronic warfare, deception, 
psychological operations (PSYOPS), police radio frequency 
intervention to spread hostile messages, and communication 
interception. Los Zetas operatives are organized by 
“Estacas” (pegs) composed of armored vehicles, twin cab 
pick-up trucks, a commander, a driver, and five gunmen. 
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Federal intelligence has reported the group moves convoys 
of 40 to 100 Estacas. The group has a large and powerful 
arsenal that includes AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles, HK 
MP-5 submachine guns, automatic pistols, hand grenades, M-
74 Antitank Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), Caliber.50 
machine guns and sniper rifles (as the Barret cal. 50), 
IEDs made of ground mines, and high explosives such  as C4, 
Tovex and dynamite, and homemade bombs. Los Zetas manpower 
is still unknown but an estimate is of 1,500 3,000 
criminals. Los Zetas is linked to the 72 foreign 
immigrant's massacre carried out in San Fernando, 
Tamaulipas, in August 2010. 
3. La Familia Michoacana 
La Familia Michoacana's origins come from a criminal 
gang in the 1980s that worked as a sort of vigilante group 
in rural areas of Michoacan state. In the 1990s, the group 
worked as marijuana farmers for the Pacific DTO. In 2003, 
Los Zetas formed an alliance with La Familia trained its 
hitmen. In 2005, La Familia Michoacana ended its alliance 
with Los Zetas and became a DTO on its own. In 2008, the 
organization threw five human heads inside a disco club in 
Uruapan City accompanied by a banner stating that La Famila 
Michoacana did not kill innocents but just carried out 
divine justice. Since then La Familia Michoacana has been 
considered by the General Attorney as one of the deadliest 
and most dangerous criminal organizations in Mexico. 
La Familia Michoacana's structure is a hierarchical 
network with a leader, a financial branch, an ideology 
branch and the operatives. The leader, Servando Gomez, has 
tried to shape the organization into a parallel state in 
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Michoacan. In every attack, La Familia Michoacana claims to 
be doing legitimate social work by ridding Michoacan of low 
level criminals. The organization has conducted a media 
campaign trying to establish permanent contact with society 
in Michoacan. La Familia Michoacana's messages appear in 
regular periodicals, on public banners and also in phone 
calls to radio and T.V. broadcasts. The financial branch is 
in charge of every criminal activity conducted by La 
Familia Michoacana. They invest a high percentage of the 
revenues in corruption and co-option of authorities at 
every level, from the municipalities to the state 
government. The collusion of authorities at state and 
municipal levels allows La Familia Michoacana to be 
involved in extortion of high level commercial and 
industrial companies to arrange complex judicial trials 
where they have received large extensions of land. Since 
2006, La Familia Michoacana has declared war against the 
Federal Police since they control the rest of the police at 
municipal and state levels. The spiritual branch is in 
charge of La Familia Michoacana's ideology dissemination, 
which is based on a pseudo-evangelic doctrine adapted from 
American writer John Eldredge's books. The spiritual branch 
was headed by Rafael Cedeno through the religious 
organization The New Jerusalem. This organization was 
responsible for adapting Eldredge’s books into La Familia 
Michoacana's Bible distributed among its members and the 
educational system in the municipalities they already 
controlled. The operatives were trained under Los Zetas 
model in camps by Guatemalan, Mexican and Colombian former 
Special Forces (DEA, 2009). The recruits spend six months 
in the training camps, isolated from society and under a 
 52
though training regime that includes the introduction and 
adoption of La Familia Michoacana pseudo-religious 
ideology. This training system and the spread of the 
ideology is intended to give legitimacy to the brutal 
methods of La Familia Michoacana making them appear to 
their members as providers of supernatural justice. 
According to the Attorney General, this is the 
characteristic that makes La Familia Michoacana so 
dangerous. Because of their training, La Familia Michoacana 
gunmen estimated at 300, leave the camps as potential 
terrorists. Nevertheless, despite their unorthodox ideology 
and modus operandi, La Familia Michoacana has gained 
control of most of the networks that previous DTOs had in 
Michoacan (Mendez, 2010). Therefore, according to United 
Nations expert Edgardo Buscaglia, by politically disrupting 
Michoacan, La Familia Michoacana is trying to cause 
governing vacuums to later fill According to the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration, La Familia 
Michoacana already controls77 municipalities, nearly 60% of 
the state's 133 municipalities (DEA, 2009). The group has 
also expanded its presence to the neighboring states of 
Estado de Mexico and Guerrero, in order to monopolize those 
states’ criminal networks by controlling supply routes. La 
Familia Michoacana is linked to the terrorist attacks 
carried out in Michoacan's capital city Morelia, during 
Independence Days in 2008, which killed eight and injured 
100 civilians attending the celebrations (Gomez, 2008).                 
4. Other Groups 
The creation of Los Zetas, and the threat they 
represented to other DTOs, forced those other DTOs to 
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create their own military arms. Many groups of gunmen, with 
diverse nicknames, emerged and started fighting in the 
streets as pseudo-military units. Many of their members 
were former regular Army troops or policeman who knew the 
basics of military tactics. According to the DEA, they are 
adapting and improving their operations in the major urban 
centers, precisely where it is most difficult to be engaged 
by conventional Armed Forces. These are the largest and 
more dangerous groups:  
a. Los Negros 
 The Sinaloa DTO created Los Negros (The Blacks) 
in order to provide personal security to the DTO  member's 
families, and to the drug trafficking activities of 
shipping and storing. In 2003, after the Gulf DTO's leader 
was arrested, 200 Los Negros' gunmen were sent to take 
control of Nuevo Laredo’s plaza (Beith, 2010). Nuevo Laredo 
has been a key city in drug trafficking since approximately 
9,000 trailer trucks, nearly 40% of ground traffic, passes 
daily through the border crossing (INEGI, 2010). The 
leaders and organizers of Los Negros were the brothers 
Alfredo, Arturo, Carlos and Hector Beltran Leyva. In 2008, 
Alfredo Beltran was captured by Mexican Army Special 
Forces, and his brothers blamed Sinaloa DTO leader Guzman 
Loera of betrayal and split from the largest organization 
to create their own DTO. In 2009, Arturo Beltran was killed 
by Navy Special Forces and Carlos was captured, causing the 
organization to defragment again. 
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b. La Linea 
La Linea (The Line) is the Ciudad Juarez DTO's 
military arm. After Amado Carrillo died in 1997, his 
brother Vicente Carrillo became the leader and created La 
Linea as a military arm to counter Los Zetas and Los Negros 
(Blancornelas, 2009). La Linea is the responsible for the 
spiraling violence that has had Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua 
under siege. According to the Attorney General, La Linea is 
acting almost as an independent DTO. The group is linked to 
a car bomb explosion in August 2010 that killed two police 
officers and a Red Cross paramedic (Milenio, 2010). 
c. Los Escorpiones 
Los Escorpiones (The Scorpions) is the military 
arm that Gulf DTO leader Ezequiel Cardenas created after 
Los Zetas split from the organization. The group is in 
charge of the Gulf DTO's plazas defense against Los Zetas 
in the Northeastern state of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon 
(SEMAR, 2010). In November 2010, Ezequiel Cardenas was 
killed in a shootout with Mexican Navy Marines. The 
operation to capture him had lasted six months since Los 
Escorpiones fire power and mobility capacity allowed him to 
escape twice from Navy Marine sieges (SEMAR, 2010). 
As noted, first and second generation DTO's 
hierarchical monolithic organizations could not control the 
paramilitary cells.  All the military arms split from the 
larger organizations creating one or more independent DTOs, 
but with totally different shape, structure and operative 
focus. The ways they are networked now make them prone to 
converge with other networks that may be either criminal or 
 55
politically-focused, such as insurgents or terrorists, and 
worsen the already unstable environment in Mexico.       
C. INSURGENT CONNECTIONS 
Most of the DTOs world wide have interacted with other 
organizations, such as insurgencies and terrorist groups 
because of the advantages found in illegal income from the 
drug trade. Nevertheless, intelligence reports have not yet 
linked domestic insurgent groups with DTOs.  However, DTOs 
in Mexico do have alleged links with foreign terrorist 
groups and insurgencies, such as the Colombian FARC, AUC 
and Lebanese Hezbollah because of the transnational range 
of the drug trade.  The insurgent groups in Mexico are 
active and any given day can join the historical pattern of 
drug and crime funding. The following are the most 
important insurgent movements in Mexico and their actual 
situation in relation to the drug trade.          
1. Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional 
The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional 
(Zapatista Army of National Liberation), EZLN is a post-
Marxist movement focused on the uprising on the eve of 
1994's New Year. Approximately 3,000 guerrillas assaulted 
and captured seven towns and the municipal government of 
San Cristobal in Chiapas (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Fuller, & 
Fuller, 1998). That was the first and only time that the 
modern Mexican Army has launched the DN-II plan, the 
strategic plan to contain serious internal peace disruption 
such as insurgencies. Army firefights with EZLN lasted for 
twelve days until Mexico's President ordered a cease fire 
 56
to open the government to dialogue. After 1994, the EZLN 
has not conducted any military operation.        
However, the EZLN is still active in Chiapas. Its 
presence is solid in the so-called autonomous territories, 
where ELZN rules under ancient indigenous law. The EZLN was 
known to have launched a “netwar”   before and after 1994 
military operations which gained substantial support from 
international NGOs and public opinion (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 
Fuller, & Fuller, 1998).     
2. Ejercito Popular Revolucionario 
The Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (People's 
Revolutionary Army), EPR is a Leftist Maoist guerrilla 
group operating in Mexico's Southwest.  The group’s 
ideology is based on the peasant revolution and was created 
in 1995 after the Aguas Blancas incident when 17 activist 
peasants were allegedly killed by Federal forces in 
Guerrero State. Its first strike against federal forces was 
exactly one year after the Aguas Blancas incident. Between 
1996 and 2007, EPR military operations have been of low 
scale, limited to ambushes and sniper shooting against 
small police and military units, and some homemade 
explosive devices set in commercial and banking facilities 
without civilian casualties. Nevertheless, in 2007, the EPR 
successfully conducted a series of bombings that targeted 
natural gas, propane and oil from the state oil company 
PEMEX's distribution pipelines. The explosions caused 
20,000 people to be displaced for security, 2,500 
commercial gas users were affected, financial losses of an 
estimated US$100 million per day, and nearly 60% of the 
steel industry closed (Jenkins, 2007). The EPR is broadly 
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linked to kidnapping of executives for ransom to fund their 
activities. They justify their targets as part of their 
struggle against capitalism. The EPR has never been proved 
to have any relationship with the drug trade; however, 
Brian Michael Jenkins claims that the EPR's funding is not 
clear enough. Jenkins’ thinks the PEMEX bombings, the 
operation's complexity, explosive devices' sophistication 
and geographical dimension are likely to be funded and 
assessed by DTO's paramilitaries. In 2009, the most radical 
arm of the EPR, the ERPI (Ejercito Revolucionario del 
Pueblo Insurgente [Insurgent People's Army]), announced 
that they were having more firefights with Sinaloa DTO's 
paramilitaries than with the Federal Army in areas that 
were not important for drug trade, which implied that DTOs 
were conducting counter-insurgency raids (Camacho, 2009). 
D. ARMED FORCES ROLE: IS VIOLENCE ATTRACTING MORE 
VIOLENCE? 
Many nongovernment organizations, such as the National 
Commission for Human Rights, CNDH, argue that one of the 
main factors that triggered violence in Mexico, was the 
drug enforcement strategy applied by the current 
presidential administration (Crespo, 2010). The core of the 
present counter-drug strategy is the use of the Armed 
Forces as the main enforcement tool. Allegedly, their 
active presence in the counter-narcotics operations caused 
violence to increase (Vega, 2010). Nevertheless, Mexican 
Armed Forces' direct participation in counter-drug 
operations in Mexico is not new. In the late 1970s, the 
Mexican government set an ambitious anti-drug operation 
with the participation of the Army and the Air Force (Toro, 
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1995). It was called Operation Condor. The Operation's 
theater was the area known as "The Golden Triangle," a vast 
mountainous zone where the northern sates of Sonora, 
Durango and Sinaloa share their borders (Toro, 1995). State 
presence was almost nonexistent in that area. Too far from 
populated areas and not easy to access, this area had the 
proper climate to cultivate Cannabis leaf (marijuana) and 
poppy crops (Blancas, 2008). The expansion of the drug 
trade concerned the government and the roughness of the 
terrain made it almost impossible for police to be 
deployed. Police forces were very limited in equipment and 
training and the only option for the government was to send 
the Military. On January 1, 1977, Operation Condor was 
launched and 10,000 Mexican Army troops were deployed to 
the area (Toro, 1995). The Operation's commander promised 
to end drug trafficking in just four months, but Operation 
Condor lasted for ten years (Astorga). In 1987, the 
Operation finished and troops were recalled. The results, 
however, were not encouraging: more than 1000 rural 
families were displaced, hundreds of villages were left 
abandoned, popular discontent toward the Army arose and 
environmental damage was caused by intense and 
indiscriminate defoliation (Cabrera, 2006). Drug lords just 
fled from the Golden Triangle to neighboring States, and 
the cocaine trade began and flourished as a more profitable 
and convenient business (Cabrera, 2006). Violence was 
sporadic because DTOs were few and were run under the old 
Mafia style. Assassinations and "Vendettas" were common 
among them, but they rarely affected people who were not 
involved in organized crime, including their own families. 
They had a non-written honor code (Escolar, 2005). 
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During Operation Condor, gunfights between Mexican 
Army troops and narco-traffickers were rare. The DTOs were 
limited in men and weapons and most of the Mexican Army 
casualties were as a result of aerial accidents. The cost 
in soldier lives for the Mexican Army during the ten-year 
Operation Condor was 116 casualties, which included Air 
Force personnel (Defense, 2009).  
The end of Operation Condor did not mean that Mexican 
Armed Forces were abandoning counter-narcotic operations. 
The DTOs changed and evolved with time becoming more 
powerful, shifting to cocaine transportation, extending 
their transnational networks and corrupting authorities. 
Meanwhile, authorities' corruption caused law enforcement 
to weaken (Astorga, 1996). In the 1990s, the Mexican Army 
and Navy started regular counter-narcotics operations in 
those areas where police could not be deployed. With 
nonexistent aerial support, limited armament and without 
proper training, police from all levels were not able to 
operate outside major urban centers. Operationally, the 
Mexican Army updated it COIN model after the Zapatista Army 
uprising in 1994. There was no modernization of the 
counter-narcotics forces because counter-narcotics 
operations were always, from the Armed Forces point of 
view, just a support for law enforcement forces, and not 
the military’s mission. By their organization and doctrine, 
the Armed Forces in Mexico were not prepared to carry out 
police functions (Portillo, 2000). Nevertheless, from 1988 
to 2005, the Mexican Army had 362 casualties on counter-
narcotics operations. All of them happened in remote 
unpopulated areas when troops were ambushed while 
destroying drug crops or because of aerial accidents during 
 60
surveillance operations (Defense, 2009). The Mexican Navy 
had 34 casualties, most of them also by accidents (Laguna, 
2008). In sum, the entire DTO's local and transnational 
networks in Mexico have been disrupted by the government 
with or without the Army.  
The most important DTO's "capos" have either been 
killed or incarcerated - Arturo Beltran, Osiel Cardenas, 
the Arellano Felix brothers (Grayson, 2010). The Mexican 
government has implemented tough anti-drug consuming 
policies. Improved laws have created new police forces and 
equipped them better. During the last decade the Armed 
Forces and federal police have intercepted by air, sea and 
land drug shipments, destroyed hundreds of thousands of 
crops and hundreds of processing laboratories. The Armed 
Forces have been directly involved in drug enforcement in 
Mexico for 33 years. The present rampage violence in 
Mexico, including the use of terrorism began just four 
years ago.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The DTO's criminal profiles have changed a lot in 
thirty years. According to Federal District Supreme Court's 
Justice Edgar Elias Azar, Drug Trafficking Organizations 
have four stages in their lifetimes. The first is the phase 
of co-option of farmers and peasants to make them shift 
their life style into the drug trade's produce. The second 
is the narco-economy that establishes complex operations to 
launder large money sums. The third is narco-power, or the 
capacity to infiltrate politics, authorities, legislators, 
and all the state's rings of power. The fourth and last 
stage is narco-terror, which uses extreme psychological 
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threats to influence all sectors that could not be 
influence in previous stages. Following this pattern,   
Mexico's DTOs are already entering the fourth stage, which 
is the most painful and costliest to the society. The 
evolution in the hierarchical structure and then networked 
compartmentalization was clearly obeyed in a necessity to 
improve the DTOs’ efficiency as enterprises. A crucial part 
of the business was the state's drug enforcement avoidance 
in order to keep the commercial flux dynamic. The 
compartmentalization forced by the state’s intervention in 
areas they could not control split the main organizations 
into smaller divisions that became empowered quickly 
because of two factors, the constant internal corruption 
that kept the state's containment control porous, and the 
external drug trade chain continuum, from the producers to 
the final consumers, that has increased. The last 
compartmentalized DTOs, and their decision to create 
military arms, split the networks even more to an almost 
leaderless level. According to Dishman, these leaderless 
structures are now more likely to converge with other 
leaderless ones, notwithstanding if they are criminal, 
terrorist or insurgents, but just with a convenient 
synergic nexus as unique condition. 
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V. HISTORICAL COMPARISON, CONVERGENCES, 
DIVERGENCES AND CONCLUSION 
Drugs and terror convergences are not the same in 
every case and have to be analyzed separately. The 
terrorist groups with political interests, such as the 
Shining Path, FARC and AUC, found a convenient source of 
funding in the drug trade and then slowly became DTOs 
themselves. The lost of legitimization and loss of the 
population's support are condemning the Shining Path and 
FARC's revolutions. The protracted war strategy that tried 
to gain support from the peasantry has been undermined by 
criminal activities that caused the population’s aversion. 
However, the global illegal drug trade is far from being 
disrupted, and FARC, Shining Path, AUC or organization can 
turn into a DTO and continue in that criminal and 
profitable world.  
On the other hand, the Medellin cartel started its 
organization as a DTO and ended facing the state directly 
by using terrorism. Pablo Escobar's case exemplified an 
incorrect strategy for guaranteeing profits from an illegal 
enterprise. According to Kidd and Walter (2006), of the 
five terrorism strategies, Escobar succesfully used the 
first two of attrition and intimidation. Beyond its 
strategic decision making, the psychological forces that 
Colombia’s conflicts have exerted on the population 
position Escobar closer to Post's (1990) psychological 
profile within terrorist motivation-actions’ boundaries. 
His psychological profile showed that he was frustated when 
seeking to legitimaze his enterprise by laundering money 
and looking  for social acceptance among the elite.  With 
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terrorism used anywhere in Colombia, Crenshaw's "perfect 
knowledge for available alternative options" (Crenshaw, 
1990)to negotiate were already out of  his reach. As was 
described, Escobar escaped from prison because he was 
comfortably running the cartel from insidewhich shows that 
the Medellin cartel was restricted higherarchically and was 
monolyitcal.Subordinates did not have the option to make 
their own decisions. As Dishman (2005) states, monolytic 
hyerarchical organizations take more care of the links they 
establish always attempting  to not converge with alien 
structures that might make them vulnerable. In the case of 
DTO enterprises as terrorists, Escobar chose to make the 
links himself and then condemned his own enterprise. The 
wrong choice brought attention to him, domestic and 
international, along with the corresponding punitive 
reaction. The case in Mexico seems to be different. In 
Escobar's time there were (as in Mexico in the same time 
frame)three major cartels. In Mexico there is now a 
universe of  DTOs. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, there are thirty DTOs operating in Mexico. 
According to Mexico's General Attorney's Special Division 
for Organized Crime Investigations there are 130 (Sanchez, 
2009). The high compartmentalization into smaller networks 
and the spread of new differently structured DTOs have made 
them prone to establish any kind of networked liasons where 
terrorism has taken its seat.                      
A. DTO'S TERRORISM IN MEXICO, WHY, WHEN AND HOW? 
1. Why? 
This thesis’ observation of Mexico's DTO evolution 
matches Chris Dishman's theory of the Leaderless Nexus, 
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which states that lower to mid-level criminals and 
terrorists take advantage of their independence to for 
synergistic ties between two groups. The first DTOs in 
Mexico, the Pacific their (based in the Golden Triangle) 
and the Gulf split in twenty years into at least thirty 
groups (DEA). The phenomenon of the creation of 
paramilitary groups has seen them turn into smaller and 
more dynamic networks. Moreover, with their military 
organization, firepower and mobility, each group has the 
space necessary to grow and empower itself, and then split 
from, and then challenge, the larger organizations. Since 
the beginning of the government's frontal offensive in 
2006, and after more than 30,000 casualties caused by drug 
related violence, many mid and low level criminals are now 
DTO's leaders, and their network contacts, related or not 
to the drug trade, but criminal, are being used to achieve 
their criminal objectives. The DTOs are nowadays fully 
involved with, and trying to control by force, those 
smaller criminal networks that used to be alienated by the 
first and second DTO generations. Clearly, DTOs, and their 
paramilitary groups, in Mexico are not concerned about 
being clandestine or discrete. Part of the chaotic 
Colombian environment that instills psychological forces in 
society exists in Mexico. The majority of DTOs gunmen are 
underage, part of a society marginalized and forgotten by 
the government and, of course, the society. There are 
leaderless nexuses, and also what Williams (2001) calls the 
"expendable periphery," hitmen that, as Escobar's Colombian 




Swiss in Spanish, but that comes from the Spanish word for 
suicidal), are being recruited by large numbers by DTOs as 
expendable forces.  
2. When? 
Observations of the development of the war on drugs 
can help to establish when a criminal network may choose 
terrorism, according to recent incidents. After the state's 
effective show of force, as when  Ciudad Juarez's La Linea 
network was disrupted by Federal Police (Grillo, 2010), and 
in loose security environments where rule of law has been 
disrupted, as when 72 immigrants were killed in San 
Fernando, and turned cities into ghost towns. According to 
Crenshaw (1990), a terrorist attack by spreading 
insecurity, making the country, in this case the urban 
centers or municipalities, ungovernable, seeks to pressure 
the regime into concessions or relaxation of coercive 
controls. With the law of rule disrupted it, a group will 
be free to join the illegal organizations. Terrorists' 
attacks may be expected to increase in major urban centers 
and military facilities which are authority symbols of law 
enforcement, after successful counter-narcotics operations. 
Despite the DTOs force in the plaza, because the weaker 
they may feel, the more constraints they will feel from 
time and options. The other areas prone to be attacked are 
those places where federal force presence is minimal, as in 
the deep countryside or small isolated towns. 
3. How? 
The DTOs terrorists' type described in the organized 
crime developing in Mexico, is mostly according to a 
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mercenaries’ models corresponding to Malcolm Nance’s (2008) 
Class IV and V terrorists: Guerrilla and or Mercenary 
Soldier, and Amateur (Civilian, Untrained Criminal, or 
Militia Vigilante) (p. 12). Under these classifications, 
the DTOs paramilitaries' trend may be predictable because 
they will fall back on basic military training and 
equipment used in military or paramilitary experience (p. 
14). They have limited training in urban terrorism tactics 
such as bombings, simple assassinations, ambushes and light 
infantry weapons assault. Their common operations are 
rather, improvised explosives and military explosives 
bombings; weapons and explosives ambushes; weapons and 
explosives assassinations; armed raids; kidnappings; 
occasional suicide bombings (not-voluntarily, mostly 
unaware) and hostage barricades (p. 15). They use underage 
participant to conduct surveillance or as gunmen (p. 16). 
The amateurs conduct simple improvised or military 
explosive bombings (grenades), arson, pistol or sniper 
assassination; physical intimidation and maiming; drive-by 
shootings; small raids and cash robberies; and easy 
kidnappings (p. 18). They all are motivated by payment. 
Often these financial arrangements may use ethnic or 
territorial rhetoric as a "political" mask for moneymaking 
goals (p. 16). The best example for the latter in Mexico is 
La Familia Michoacana.   
B. STATE RESPONSES 
The United States in its long time alliance with 
Colombia has implemented many aid programs to enhace 
Colombian stability efforts. By 1996, the U.S. military aid 
to Colombia was up to US$66 million. It increased to US$287 
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million in 1998, and jumped to a package of US$1.3 billion 
in 2000 under the Plan for Peace in Colombia, later called 
Plan Colombia. The Plan was designed to establish an 
integral counter-narcotics and counter-guerrilla 
strategyand included  500 military personnel as trainers 
and 300 contractors to help with coca crops eradication 
(Livingstone, 2005). The Plan's aid was added to by US$380 
million in 2001 by President George W. Bush, and then with 
US$463 million under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative was implemented to aid all 
the Andean region countries, as it continues being the 
world's largest coca producer (Stokes, 2005).  Most of Plan 
Colombia aid went directly the improvement of the Armed 
Forces and Colombia's social stabilization has been 
exemplary (Haddick, 2010). 
In 2008, the U.S. Congress aproved US$1.6 billion aid 
to Mexico as part of the security cooperation between the 
countries(Starr, 2007). Cooperation between the states 
directly related to the drug trade in Latin America is 
essential. The integral approach that Mexico must apply to 
tackle the drug trade problem from its roots must be backed 
up by similar counter measures in the states that are 
involved, to cause a restrictive effect on DTOs by limiting 
their movements. In Mexico's case, securty stability has 
seriously deteriorated, even when numbers are not alarming, 
social perception and discontent continues to be. Industry, 
commerce, and tourism have dropped to alarming levels 
because the environement in Mexico is clearly unsafe. 




violence to rise and be considered terrorism mainly when 
DTO' paramilitary groups keep growing in number and 
weaponry.  
According to the terrorism strategies outlined by Kidd 
and Walter, DTO paramilitary groups in Mexico are waging a 
war of attrition, intimidation, provocation and spoiling 
because the state conditions allow it. Mexico is a 
democracy that recently experienced a political transition 
that it had not had for nearly eighty years. The efforts to 
consolidate the Mexican state as a modern democracy 
represents some constraints in the use of force that 
benefite DTO's paramilitaries‘ attrition strategy. The lack 
of an effective police force at municipal and state levels 
benefits DTO's paramilitaries strategies focused on 
intimidation.   The turf wars, when at least two rival DTOs 
are present in the same plaza, represent a strategy of 
provocation and spoiling.  
The counter measures proposed by Kidd and Walter can 
be  adapted.The concession of inessential issues to the 
DTO's paramilitary groups does not apply for Mexico's case 
since the rule of law that is at stake cannot be flexible. 
The valid counters must then be: 
a) Precise targeted retaliation that minimizes 
collateral damages. Strong and superior 
intelligence supported by a target centric 
approach, instead of the traditional intelligence 
cycle,  and the technologic requirements to 
achieve it.  
b) Influence likely targets of government officials 
and the military and enforcement forces to avoid 
their cooperating with DTOs. 
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c) Deny access to weapons for the DTOs. The 
reinforcement of the intelligence capabilities by 
the Armed Forcesso that a capable law enforcement 
force is ready to track and disrupt contraband 
networks. 
d) Strive to minimize the psychological costs of the 
attacks, mainly in  public facilities in urban 
centers which are vulnerable. 
e) Strenghtening of law enforcement. In this case a 
re-structuring of the enforcement system must be 
at every level including effective mechanisms to 
succesfully compete with organized crime’s 
recruting.               
C. CONCLUSION: MODELING VICTORY 
A victory in the war on drugs in Mexico depends on 
social factors far beyond the Armed Forces mission. 
Nevertheless, the Armed Forces are the most reliable 
institution in Mexico according to the Mexican society's 
perception. Social reconstruction can be supported by Armed 
Forces labor, just as aid to the population is based on 
Armed Forces operations during natural disasters, health 
contingencies and others that have required a rapid and 
solid response. However, some adjustments, mainly a new 
legal framework, are required in order to use the military 
effectively, and according to international law, in public 
security affairs. 
The effective mechanisms to control the drug trade 
need further implementation, as global statistics show. 
Nevertheless, the power that drug incomes give to non-state 
actors can be countered if a state adapts rapidly. An 
effective anti-drug policy to be applied by the 
international community has not yet appeared. The drug 
trade, its offers and demands, are deeply rooted in social 
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factors. But, as in any other criminal activity, it will be 
diminished as the state recovers the capability to maintain 
law, justice and force monopolization. There were lessons 
learned in Peru and Colombia at a very high cost. Terrorism 
is just another tactic at any non-State actor's hand, 
notwithstanding the goals that made them opt to use it. 
Political, criminal or ideological, terrorism’s utility and 
impact will be defined by the state's weakness or strength. 
Peru and Colombia spent vital time and resources trying to 
integrate governmental strategies to contain the violence. 
Social decomposition, inequalities and partisan interests 
cannot be tackled by a state in ten years; but in ten 
years, a state can be defeated by its own society if that 
society goes out of control. Latin American countries have 
more social similarities than dissimilarities historically. 
All the cases in this thesis were, and continue to be, 
social challenges more than a military one. Some of the 
deepest factors that can degrade the social contract are 
now present in Mexico. Mexico is facing spiraling violence 
that is escalating to unprecedented levels. Mexico's 
geographical situation benefited the drug trade's 
development by a veil of corruption. Peru and Colombia went 
through the establishment of emergency powers, called for 
international aid, and had a high cost in human rights 
violations. At the end, a decisive turn to efficient and 
professional security forces was the platform for a long 
term stabilization strategy. In those cases, terrorism was 
the red light that announced to the state that it needed to 
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